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ABstrACt Conflict in the countries of Latin America presents common features: platforms of exclusion 
and chronic inequalities that are under challenge from citizens; complex struggles relating 
these inequalities with their number and intensity; a combination of social protests that 
are manifested both at the national level and at the general cultural level; practical 
rationalities in the tensions arising from social reproduction1 that coexist with demands 
for greater institutional efficiency and effectiveness and with systemic cultural conflicts. 
Other common factors are States that are omnipresent in all spheres of conflict but have 
only a limited ability to process them, and societies with fragmented conflicts; new public 
spaces where tensions are represented in a contradictory way, and conflicts that have 
been moving on to information and communication networks, with multiplier effects in 
the new environments where power is increasingly exercised. There is increased social 
complexity related to political systems and States with limited management capabilities. 
The situations and scenarios in prospect are diverse and options remain open.
1  This means that actors are driven mainly by a logic of concrete results that help to meet their social reproduction needs. Ideological narratives 
are circumstantial to the political situations experienced.
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The world today is at a critical juncture, since a number 
of different crises are coming to a head at the same 
time, as are transformations and choices of a financial, 
multicultural, environmental and political nature. What 
is unprecedented is the way changes with multiple 
characteristics are now manifesting themselves in full 
force.
Certain features of globalization are undergoing a 
process of transcendental change, and this is coinciding 
with a far-reaching recomposition of economic power 
and the sources of the planet’s economic growth. A 
new multilateralism is taking root. The new emerging 
economies are adopting “heterodox” models of 
capitalism or the market economy, associated with 
political orientations whose ideological discourses are 
divergent: practical reformism, popular nationalism,2 
“neo-developmentalist indigenism” and conservative 
modernization (Calderón, 2008).
In Latin America, the economy has grown, poverty 
has been reduced and progress has been made with some 
distributive effects (eclac, 2010a; undp, 2009). The 
region has displayed remarkable political and managerial 
capabilities in dealing with the global crisis. In addition, 
growth projections there are quite favourable (Aranibar, 
Vázquez and Garzón, 2011).
However, productive transformation and the switch 
to a knowledge economy do not seem to be occurring as 
dynamically as is required if progress is to be made with 
the region’s grave problems of poverty and inequality. 
Social inclusion and innovation are an equation that 
has yet to be solved. Similarly, a number of indicators 
of political legitimacy have improved; nonetheless, too 
little progress has been made towards a democracy of 
citizens (undp, 2004).
The problem is to know how to progress in this 
direction. What political capabilities are required? 
How can growth, redistribution and environmental 
sustainability be skilfully combined? How can the 
 The author is grateful for the assistance of Lorenza Fontana, María 
Isabel Nava and Huascar Pacheco in the preparation of this document, 
to papep-United Nations Development Programme (undp) and to 
the unir Foundation in Bolivia for allowing the use of findings from 
the report Los conflictos sociales en América Latina, which was 
coordinated by the author.




political cycle the region is going through be associated 
with a cycle of transformations in its economic and 
production structures? How can cultural pluralism and 
institutions continue to be constructed in a manner suited 
to innovative economic change? A central issue in all 
these processes is social conflict and the ways this can 
be dealt with from a perspective that treats democracy 
as institutionalized conflict. This is the area the present 
study covers. The theses that will now be presented need 
to be viewed from a threefold perspective: historically, 
conceptually and as part of the process of global change.
In most of the region’s countries, the common, 
central and historical feature of the contemporary conflict 
dynamic is the early appearance of the State as a social 
actor, something that not only reflects these societies’ 
tendency towards social and political conflict but that 
has actively shaped the systems of economic interests 
and political actors which define the dynamic of conflict.
In the first cycle of populism experienced by 
the region, conflicts turned upon and were directed 
towards the formation of an autonomous nation-State, 
industrialization and the development of an inclusive 
modernization process underpinned by a solid culture 
of popular nationalism (Touraine, 1988).3
Under the dictatorships, the conflicts which social 
actors generated were in essence purely defensive actions, 
since authoritarian regimes “resolved” any manifestation 
of conflict by repression. Struggles and demands for 
human rights and political democratization developed 
with increasing force in this context (Ansaldi, 1986).
Democratization gave rise to new fields of conflict 
and to the revitalization of social movements or the 
emergence of new ones, or both. All this is analysed in 
the series of national studies entitled Los movimientos 
sociales ante la crisis (Calderón, 1986). In this study, a 
first field of conflict identified was the defence of workers’ 
status. A second field were demands for urban quality 
of life, collective consumption and decentralization. 
A third field were rural conflicts over land, the market 
and ethnic recognition. Human rights and the quest for 
 
3 A culture of popular nationalism is one that seeks political hegemony, 
centralization of development and democracy in the State, mass 
mobilization and charismatic leadership.
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equitable gender relationships were another significant 
field of conflict in this period.
Following structural reforms, conflict turned on the 
defence of living conditions and the discontent created 
by the reification of the market. In the late 1990s, in what 
was a historic turning point in terms of both democracy 
and development, a new type of conflict emerged, one 
that was more socially complex and multifaceted, with 
both conflicts and actors proliferating. Most prominent 
in this context were conflicts turning on multiculturalism 
and positions relating to new forms of quality of life, 
citizenship and dignity (papep-undp, 2011).
Conceptually, the region’s conflicts can be said to 
link demands for real freedom and cultural freedom. By 
the former is meant a set of demands whose objective 
is to meet the needs of a decent life so that people can 
then go on to build capacities and choose the type of life 
they wish to lead, in accordance with their own values 
and aspirations. By the second is meant recognition 
of the identities and rights of individuals and cultural 
communities, in connection with the right to adopt and 
change identities (Sen, 1999; undp, 2004).
In the conceptual approach of this article, 
constructivist policy is taken to be the best way of 
processing conflicts.4 Political constructivism comes to 
terms with socioeconomic realities and power gambits 
in the effort to strengthen democracy, and sets out from 
the recognition of a sociocultural plurality out of which 
a common order has to be created, without losing sight 
of the fact that this order is the outcome of a process of 
conflict. Conflict is not synonymous with war; rather, 
the institutionalized conflict inherent in diversity and 
interculturality is the precondition for democracy and 
peace. According to this approach, politics and social 
actors are being constantly made and remade in conflict 
that is sustained by unequal power relationships which 
are also real and historical. Consequently, actors are 
shaped in politics, where everyone is subject to power 
relationships. This text synthesizes a normative view of 
politics as value-oriented politics. As Gianni Vattimo 
would have it, we do not agree when we have the truth; 
rather, we find the truth when we agree (Vattimo, 2006).
4 The basis for political constructivism is the political ability of actors 
to create an order with an integral role for conflict based on interaction 
and mutual recognition between those who are different or opposed, 
something that entails an appreciation of the freedom and identity of 
the other. Constructivist policy can be understood as the art of the best 
possible. Policymaking entails the exchange of reciprocal recognitions 
(papep-undp, 2011, chapter 1). Methodologically, to explain this type 
of action it is essential to determine the structural and institutional 
bases on which action rests and the effects of the socialization with 
which actors are associated (Boudon and Bourricaud, 1982, p. 308).
This paper does not argue for or against any 
particular type of society. What it argues for, primarily, 
is an institutionalized political way of accommodating 
differences so that shared goals can be constructed 
without denying the existence either of power or of 
conflict and disagreement in all sorts of areas. Here, 
politics becomes not an instrument of negotiation but 
an exercise in understanding the memory and freedom 
of the other.
From this perspective, the argument is that a 
society which produces conflict and change that is 
constructively processed through institutions will be 
more fertile in democracy and development, whereas if 
the society produces conflicts and its institutions are poor 
at processing these, the results in terms of democracy 
and development will be problematic, as they will be 
if the society is poor at producing conflict and change 
and its institutions are strong but are unable to process 
conflicts democratically. In situations where society, the 
State and institutions are all weak, as will be seen later 
on, informal systems of intermediation and oversight 
are what will prevail in the reproduction of the social 
order. For Latin America, the classic thinking of Marcel 
Mauss is still important.
In summary, how do conflicts affect democracy and 
development opportunities? This is exactly the question 
the present article sets out to answer.
Methodologically, the conflicts identified and 
interpreted in this study have been taken from the 
narratives developed by 54 periodicals in 17 countries 
of the region over a year. These publications represent 
different ideological positions, have substantial markets 
for information and often form part of complex global 
and local networks relying on the use and development 
of the new information and communication technologies 
(icts). This being so, it is very important to emphasize 
that the empirical basis for this study are the conflicts 
reported on by the periodicals selected. Although 
these and other media helped to shape public opinion 
about these events, a larger number of conflicts went 
unreported. This is obviously a serious limitation for 
studies of this kind, which in any event often confuse 
reporting with reality. However, consistency tests were 
carried out using other statistical sources covering 
national and sectoral cases, and similar qualitative trends 
were found. Nonetheless, it must be realized that the 
information is inadequate. What were mainly studied 
here were conflicts in the public communication space, 
on the basis of the written press.
Quantitatively, Latin America is confirmed as a 
region with a substantial level of conflict. Yet the study 
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was conducted in a period when the continent was 
emerging from the global crisis and there was relative 
sociopolitical stability. It was a time when the “box” 
where intense radicalism and widespread conflict appear 
was empty. There were no serious crises of governance 
in the region, other than the coup in Honduras. The 
analysis detected 2,318 conflicts and 4,724 conflict 
episodes between October 2009 and September 2010. 
Broadly speaking, the countries with the largest number 
of conflicts were Argentina, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, with a total of over 200. The countries 
with the fewest conflicts in the region were Chile, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador, averaging 58. The countries where 
conflicts were most radical were the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile and the Dominican Republic, while 
they were least radical in Costa Rica, Panama and Peru. 
Figure 1 shows the degree of radicalization; and this is 





Seizure of facilities/institutions/places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.1%
Attacks on people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2%
Siege/ambush/interception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.1%
Armed uprising
Confrontation
Industrial stoppages/strikes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21%
Destruction of property  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.7%
Crucifixion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.2%
Sewing of lips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.08%
Manifesto
Hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5%
Rallies/vigils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16%
Blockades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12.8%
Marches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10.6%
Pre-conflict
Announcement of conflict  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21.9%
Ultimatum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.2%
Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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The theses that will now be presented highlight the most 
frequent characteristics, common features and shared 
challenges facing the different Latin American societies.
thesis 1
The characteristics of Latin America’s complex inequality 
are bound up not only with significant levels of social 
differentiation and high levels of wealth and income 
concentration, but also citizens’ discontent with and 
questioning of these levels of inequality. This is why 
inequality underlies most of the social protests and 
conflicts in the region.
Latin America has been enjoying a favourable 
economic environment, buttressed by a sound 
macroeconomy, high growth and a degree of redistribution 
through social policies; inequality remains a structural 
problem in the region, however. The undp Regional 
Human Development Report for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2010 mentions three characteristic features 
of inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: it 
is high, persistent, and reproduced in a context of low 
socioeconomic mobility. The report also emphasizes 
that the region’s countries are among the world’s 
most unequal in household per capita income terms: 
10 of the world’s 15 most unequal countries are Latin 
American. Thus, the Gini income coefficient for Latin 
America and the Caribbean is “65% higher than in 
high-income countries, 36% higher than the income 
inequality observed in East Asian countries, and 18% 
higher than the level reported for sub-Saharan Africa” 
(undp, 2010, p. 37).
Figure 2 shows the high levels of concentration 
in the region’s income distribution, with the richest 
20% of the population receiving 56.81% of all income 
and the poorest 20% just 3.4%. According to Forbes 
magazine, the richest in Latin America received 
US$ 332 billion between them, 17 times as much as 
the gross domestic product (gdp) of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and 19 times as much as the gdp of 
Paraguay (Forbes, 2011).
Citizens perceive these levels of inequality as 
unfair and there is a standing demand for change, 
which explains the strength of social conflicts even 
in situations where major progress has been made in 
reducing the poverty Latin America has suffered from (see 
figure 3).5 According to data from Informe Latinobarómetro 
2010, 79% of Latin Americans consider that income is 
distributed unfairly.
thesis 2
The public media space is increasingly where social 
conflicts are given expression and narratives about them 
constructed. This is bound up with the massive expansion 
and proliferation of the new icts. Actors in conflicts need 
the communications media and these need conflicts in 
a media logic of conflict and power.
5 According to the Social Panorama of Latin America, the number 
of poor people fell by 5% in 2010, in a resumption of the regional 





(Income quintiles and percentages)
Richest 56,81
Each horizontal band represents 











Latin American population Income
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), 
“cepalstat. Latin America and The Caribbean Statistics”, 2009.
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The media are a source of power, institutions and 
firms that construct meanings and public imaginaries 
about conflict, socializing individuals. Just as the media 
need conflicts, conflicts need the media, which are public 
spaces where power relations are reflected, created and 
fought over and where conflicts between contending 
actors are recognized. The media are not neutral, but 
nor are they mechanical instruments of power; they are 
where political and social interests are expressed and 
where different journalistic approaches meet. They are 
also businesses. Their characteristics will depend on the 
market and on the interplay of interests and pressures 
among actors.
The concentration of media ownership is reflected 
in the types of Latin American media conglomerates. 
Three types or sizes of media conglomerates have been 
found to coexist in the region. The first, which may be 
termed “large”, own businesses covering the four key 
communications platforms of the global market (print 
media, audiovisual media, web platforms and mobile 
multimedia) to differing degrees at the regional level; the 
term can also apply to those that do not have a presence 
in all four segments but own a large section of the media 
considered locally important in one or another of them. 
The second group or category, termed “medium-sized”, 
are corporations which do not own media outlets outside 
their own country but operate in three or four of the 
communication platforms mentioned in their local market. 
Lastly, there is the “small” group, consisting mainly of 
publishers that have an ever-increasing ability to offer 
products on different platforms for different audiences 
but own no more than a couple of print publications, 
do not have complex distribution platforms and do not 
participate in major information and communication 
networks at the regional or global level. Table 1 exemplifies 
the features of the groups mentioned.
In the media/society dialectic, it is not only that 
there is a complementary relationship between the media 
and those involved in conflict. From a constructivist 
perspective, the media construct reality, helping to 
delineate narratives and imaginaries that ultimately 
have repercussions in the real world, i.e., in the political 
system, the decision-making process and the agencies 
of social actors.
FIGURE 3
Perceptions of wealth distribution in Latin America, 2010
(Percentages)
Proportions answering “Very fair” and “Fair” to the question: “How fair do you think the distribution of income is in (country)?”
Series 1, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of), 38
Series 1, Ecuador, 33
Series 1, Panama, 32
Series 1, Bolivia (Plur. State of), 26
Series 1, Uruguay, 26
Series 1, Costa Rica, 26
Series 1, Brazil, 21
Series 1, Honduras, 20
Series 1, Paraguay, 19
Series 1, El Salvador, 16
Series 1, Guatemala, 16
Series 1, Colombia, 15
Series 1, Mexico, 15
Series 1, Peru, 14
Series 1, Chile, 12
Series 1, Argentina, 12
Series 1, Dominican Republic, 12
Series 1, Latin America, 21
79% of Latin Americans 
consider that income is 
distributed unfairly
Source: Latinobarómetro Corporation, Informe Latinobarómetro 2010, Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/
LATDatos.jsp.
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TABLE 1
types of media conglomerate
“Large” media group
Publication Multimedia group
El País (Uruguay) Grupo de Diarios América (gda)
O Globo (Brazil) Organizações Globo/Grupo de Diarios América (gda)
El Mercurio (Chile) Grupo de Diarios América (gda)
La Tercera (Chile) Grupo Copesa S.A./Consorcio Periodístico de Chile
Reforma (Mexico) Grupo Reforma
La Prensa (Argentina) Multimedios La Capital
“Medium-sized” media group
Publication Multimedia group
El Tiempo (Colombia) Grupo Planeta
El Comercio (Peru) Grupo de Diarios América (gda)
El Periódico (Guatemala) Media Development Loan Fund (mdlf)
El Universal (Mexico) Grupo de Diarios América (gda)
El Panamá América (Panama) Grupo Epasa
El Nacional (Dominican Republic) Grupo Corripio
El Colombiano (Colombia) Periódicos Asociados Latinoamericanos
Ultimas Noticias (Venezuela) Cadena Capriles
La Nación (Costa Rica) Grupo de Diarios América (gda)
La Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador) Grupo Dutriz
Diario Libre (Dominican Republic) Omnimedia Grupo Multimedia/Periódicos asociados latinoamericanos
La Nación (Paraguay) Grupo Nación de Comunicaciones
La República (Uruguay) Grupo ick
El Espectador (Colombia) Grupo Bavaria
La Prensa (Honduras) Grupo Organización Publicitaria Sociedad Anónima (opsa)
La Jornada (Mexico) —
El Día (Dominican Republic) Grupo Corripio
Jornal de Brasilia (Brazil) Grupo Jornal de Brasilia
O Estado de São Paulo (Brazil) Grupo Estado
El Deber (Plurinational State of Bolivia) Grupo Líder
Los Tiempos (Plurinational State of Bolivia) Grupo Líder
La Razón (Plurinational State of Bolivia) Grupo Líder
El Heraldo (Honduras) Grupo Organización Publicitaria S.A. (opsa)
La Nación (Argentina) La Nación S.A.
“Small” media group
Publication Multimedia group
ABC Color (Paraguay) Editorial Azeta S.A.
El Universo (Ecuador) Grupo El Universo
El Universal (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) Periódicos Asociados Latinoamericanos
El Diario de Hoy (El Salvador) América Interactiva
La Tribuna (Honduras) Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé
El Mercurio (Ecuador) Grupo Merchán
Diario Expreso (Peru) Expreso S.A.
Prensa Libre (Guatemala) Casa Editorial Prensa Libre S.A.
La Nación (Chile) Empresa Periodística La Nación S.A./Chilean State
Correo (Peru) Empresa Periodística Nacional S.A. (epensa)
Crónica (Paraguay) Grupo Nacional de Comunicaciones
Expreso (Ecuador) Grupo Gráficos Nacionales S.A. (Granasa)
La República (Costa Rica) República Media Group (rmg)
El Mundo (El Salvador) Grupo Mundo Multimedia
La Hora (Guatemala) Familia Marroquín
La Prensa (Panama) Corporación La Prensa S.A. (Corprensa)
Página 12 (Argentina) Editorial La Página S.A.
Jornal do Brasil (Brazil) Nelson Tanure/Editora Jornal do Brasil
Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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thesis 3
Conflicts have complex rationalities and differing 
intensities. Their frequency is not the same as their 
radicalism, and both are unequally related to levels of 
institutional legitimacy and social divides. Thus, the 
greater the social divides and the lower the level of 
institutional legitimacy, the more conflicts there are. 
Likewise, the more support there is for the institutional 
political regime, the fewer the conflicts that reach the 
point of violent clashes.
One of the patterns of social conflict in the region 
encountered by the present study was the asynchrony of 
conflict, i.e., there are conflicts with differing directions, 
intensities and meanings relating to basic living standards 
with demands (mainly directed at the State) for effective 
and legitimate institutional management and strategies 
for change in the dynamics of intercultural relations. At 
the same time, one of the central findings of the study 
is how complex the asynchrony of conflict is, since, as 
already mentioned, the deeper the divides in society and 
the weaker the legitimacy of the institutional regime, the 
greater the number of conflicts (see figure 4).
Again, the relationship between the radicalism of 
conflicts, institutional legitimacy, social divides and the 
number of conflicts is very important, but more complex. 
As noted earlier, the level of support for the institutional 
regime will determine whether or not conflicts reach the 
stage of violent clashes (see figure 5).
The relationship between social divides and 
radicalization is not linear but U-shaped: countries with 
intermediate divides have fewer cases of violence and 
FIGURE 4




































































































Average legitimacy (LAPOP 2010)b Number of conflicts (10) Percentage of violent conflicts
Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
a There is no significant or major correlation between levels of institutional legitimacy and conflict radicalization; a reading of the chart 
indicates that there is no obvious relationship between legitimacy and conflict intensity in the region. On the other hand, there does seem 
to be a relationship between the number of conflicts and the level of institutional legitimacy: countries with lower levels of institutional 
legitimacy would appear to have a greater propensity to social conflict, although this relationship is not conclusive and is only marginally 
significant in statistical terms.
b lapop 2010: Latin American Public Opinion Project for 2010.
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clashes than countries with wide divides and countries 
with narrow divides. This appears to be due to the 
different forms of interaction between society, the State 
and conflicts, the ability to process these and, in general, 
a country’s history and political culture. There is some 
good news here for the region, since there is now an 
“empty box” favourable to democracy and development: 
social conflict in the Latin American countries is neither 
very intense nor highly radicalized.
thesis 4
The State is a central actor in the interplay of power and 
conflict, but it has only a limited capacity to manage 
them and resolve them in a way that contributes to 
social cohesion and extends democracy. The result is 
a paradox, with States catalysing social demands but 
lacking the capacity to manage them.
On the one hand, as figure 6 reveals, the main 
target of demands in Latin America is the State, 
accounting for 70% of cases. In other words, the 
State is the focus for social discontent in efforts to get 
demands met or attain objectives. On the other hand, 
society is undergoing a progressive fragmentation of 
collective actors and their identities, something that 
is reflected in a tendency for demands to proliferate 
outside of the traditional institutionalized frameworks 
of conflicts.
FIGURE 5
relationship between social divides and number of conflicts/proportion  
of conflicts radicalized
Average number of conicts Average percentage of highly radicalized conicts 

















Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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A contrasting tendency can be seen among actors 
instigating demands in the region: the prevailing 
fragmentation of those engaging in conflict. The most 
important actors are local organizations (19%), and it 
is also significant that 5% of conflicts are driven by 
circumstantial actors,6 i.e., groupings of individuals 
6 These are collective actors who appear at the time of the conflict 
and then vanish.
who are fighting for specific one-off demands and 
needs and whose organization breaks up once these 
concrete issues have been resolved. It is in this sector 
that the trend towards spontaneous collective action 
is most in evidence, embodying in terms of conflict 
that “liquid modernity” spoken of by Bauman (1999 
and 2005). All this suggests the hypothesis that the 












































































Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
a The main actors in conflicts are local/community actors (19%) and miscellaneous other (15%), including circumstantial actors, irregular groups 
and groups associated with sectoral production and collective activities such as hydrocarbons, finance, mining, coordinating committees, 
unions, associations, trade bodies and education (14%).
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For all the centrality of demands targeting States, 
situations vary greatly. There are countries with a greater 
State capacity (Uruguay) and thus a greater capacity 
for processing conflicts, and countries with lesser 
capabilities, such as the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Peru and Ecuador. 
From a general perspective, the State is perceived 
almost everywhere in the region as the only actor capable 
of solving macrostructural problems and their local 
manifestations. There is a tendency towards centralization 
of social demands which confirms a historical pattern in the 
region whereby the State has played and continues to play 
a leading role. Conflicts are not distributed in a balanced 
way across the different social spaces, and demands most 
commonly take on a political connotation. As already 
pointed out by Calderón and Dos Santos (1987, p. 15), 
in Latin America “the lack of constitutional technologies 
capable of institutionalizing conflict management” 
compounds “the socially exclusive tendencies of order”.
This leaves the paradox of a weak State as the 
main focal point for powerful social demands: appeals 
are still to a State machinery that is usually inadequate 
and unable to provide negotiated institutional responses, 
being trapped by the inefficiencies of its bureaucracy, 
the ineffectiveness of its legal system, the lack of 
credibility of its governments and chronic problems of 
corruption and patronage. At the same time, the process 
of centralization in the collective imaginary reaches 
the highest levels, where the central government is the 
State, indeed the president is the State, in a historical 
and cultural evolution where personality-driven rule 
has almost never ceased to play a central role in Latin 
American politics.
Lastly, it is necessary to stress the importance of the 
normative and institutional framework when it comes to 
understanding the dynamics of social conflict. This can 
play a very important role in channelling tensions and 
keeping potential outbreaks of violence under control, 
organizing social demands, providing actors with 
forums for recognition and expression and promoting 
dialogue-based political forms of decision-making. What 
is considered here is the value of democracy as a system 
that sets political ground rules capable of processing 
conflicts (Lechner, 1986). This being so, there seems 
to be no substitute for the institutional dimension when 
it comes to social change, and nor can demands for 
social citizenship or participation in decision-making be 
lastingly satisfied unless institutional limitations have 
been overcome (Calderón and Dos Santos, 1987, p. 17). 
Furthermore, manifest and deep-rooted dysfunctions in 
institutional systems lie at the root of specific cruxes 
of conflict, while at the same time they complicate the 
handling of social tensions of different kinds (both 
tensions over social reproduction and those relating to 
culture and political ideology).
 
thesis 5
There is a tendency for conflicts to become decentralized 
and for local experiences with democratic conflict 
processing to emerge. This tendency leads to the 
development of a new politics centring on constructive 
relationships between actors and municipal measures that 
are characterized by legitimacy and effectiveness, possess 
civic agency in processes and results and ultimately 
construct a citizenship democracy on a local scale.
Despite the prevailing logic of centralism, or 
decentralization without deconcentration of resources, 
there are current and historical tendencies for conflicts 
to be decentralized down to the territorial, municipal or 
regional level of the State. As figure 6 illustrates, 16% 
of all conflicts recorded in the study period involved 
demands directed at the local State and 6% demands 
directed at regional governments.
In some important cases, this trend has been 
associated with the emergence of sociocultural and political 
actors seeking to extend a constructivist policy. As can be 
seen from table 2, the cases of the cities of Porto Alegre, 
Rosario, Bogotá, La Paz and Villa El Salvador, among 
others, are remarkable examples of public policies being 
applied to the processing of social conflicts in favour of 
a pluralistic and substantive democracy better able to 
cope with the problems of inequality and development.
These experiences and others like them show that 
it is possible to find and perhaps disseminate examples 
where the attempt has been made to turn conflicts, or 
some part of them, into agreements that are transformed 
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thesis 6
In a combined but unequal logic, there are three fields of 
conflict associated with social reproduction, institutional 
logic and the cultural dynamic. Social reproduction is 
organized by a practical logic and is an end in itself, 
as it constitutes an ethical touchstone for politics and 
culture: human dignity.
With the idea of obtaining a regional overview of 
collective action orientations, the study identifies three 
major fields of conflict in Latin America, encompassing 
the different demands that give rise to collective action: 
(i) social reproduction demands, (ii) institutional demands 
and (iii) cultural demands. The three fields partially 
differ in their rationale: (1) social reproduction conflicts 
mainly include demands for the satisfaction of the basic 
social welfare needs that are the minimum for a decent 
life, making possible the reproduction of individuals and 
human groups, and their logic is essentially practical; 
(2) institutional conflicts pursue greater effectiveness and 
legitimacy for State institutions; (3) the goal of cultural 
conflicts is to change the way people live (and they are 
thus strategic conflicts, as will be seen).
Figure 7 shows the percentage of each field of 
conflict by country and by subregion. It can be seen that 
social reproduction conflicts are the most numerous in 
the great majority of the countries, the exceptions being 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where institutional 
conflicts outweigh them. Colombia and Mexico are the 
countries with the greatest number of cultural conflicts.
Social reproduction means the ability of a society to 
reproduce itself and change over time, and concerns both 
basic reproduction thresholds (food, health, education, 
employment, etc.) and extended thresholds relating to 
quality of life in general and to the concepts of well-
being and a decent life as a condition for true freedom 
(Sen, 1999). It is in this field of conflict that the practical 
logic of social mobilization is becoming plainer to see. 
People take to the streets to ask for improvements in 
their living conditions and demand certain guarantees 
in the reproduction process, whether for better pay and 
employment conditions or assistance with health and 
education issues, or against economic measures that are 
perceived as destabilizing to the status quo.
Most social reproduction conflicts arise over 
socioeconomic issues, especially those involving 
employment and wages and collective consumption, but 
also as a rejection of certain political or social measures 
perceived as threatening the labour market status quo, 
and in support of norms that could improve the current 
situation, or over matters relating to land ownership and 
usage (see figure 8). Over half of all social reproduction 
conflicts are rooted in employment/wage demands 
(59.20 %). The relative importance of labour conflicts, 
in particular, reveals the strategic role work plays in the 
lives of our societies, in terms of both participation in 
employment and the quality of social life.
Furthermore, the data on social reproduction 
conflicts back up the structural data, in the sense that 
collective action seems to be consistent with the real 
socioeconomic problems perceived in the region. Social 
reproduction conflicts represent 47.3% of all conflicts in 
Latin America, and their relative importance is greater 
still if it is considered that these conflicts are the most 
numerous in 12 of the region’s 17 countries, while in 
nine of them employment/pay issues and the economic 
situation are at the root of over 50% of conflicts.
At the subregional level, the Andean countries 
and Central America have similar levels of conflict 
over social reproduction, which accounts for some 
42% of all conflicts in these areas, while the number 
of conflicts in the Southern Cone is larger (58.7%) 
(see figure 9).
TABLE 2
Paradigmatic decentralization processes in Latin America
Country City Process
Brazil Porto Alegre Decentralization and local democratization
Bolivia (Plu. St. of) La Paz Decentralization and popular participation
Argentina Rosario Decentralization and local democratization
Uruguay Montevideo Participatory decentralization
Peru Villa El Salvador Participatory Development Planning and Budgeting System
Colombia Bogotá Administrative decentralization
Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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FIGURE 7
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In this field, conflicts that tend to acquire a significant 
level of radicalization are those relating to land (53%) and 
employment/pay (49%), and protests against economic 
measures (42%) (see figure 10).
The data on averages confirm that the most 
radicalized conflicts are those over land. Although there 
are fewer such conflicts, they present a greater tendency 
to violence than do other types. This suggests that, first, 
there is a lack of institutional spaces for dealing with these 
demands and, second, these conflicts tend to combine 
with other factors, such as the issue of identities in the 
case of ethnic groups, or local economic and political 
interests, which increases their centrifugal ideological 
charge. Furthermore, the agrarian question is still a 
pending issue on the reform agenda of many Latin 
American countries, and the social consequences of a 
“neo-feudal” latifundista system with strong roots in 
the region continue to make themselves felt.
thesis 7
Institutional conflicts arise from dissatisfaction with the 
effectiveness and efficiency of institutions. A feature seen 
across the region is the strength of a “para-institutional” 
cultural of conflict.
Institutional conflict is a result of the inconsistency 
between people’s demands and the inability of State 








































Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 




Share of conicts by country
Low 0 - 40 Medium 41 - 60
High 61 - 70 No information
Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United 
Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos 
sociales en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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In particular, there is an emerging type of conflict 
that is more focused on criticizing the functioning of 
institutions or the State than the system as such, although 
in some cases criticism of the system is a general 
background to the positions taken.
The rationale for conflicts in this category is the 
need to improve institutions, understood in their more 
practical aspects as administrative management, public 
service provision, legal and judicial problems and the 
legitimacy of the public authorities. Struggles arise over 
both the lack of institutional structures and demands for 
the institutionalization of social actors.
Many of the conflicts characterizing Latin America 
derive from the weak application of norms and the 
inefficiencies of the State rather than from a lack of 
norms and institutions. In this way, the State is a major 
generator of conflict.
Institutional conflict is the second most important 
area in quantitative terms, representing 37.7% of all 
conflicts, and includes demands motivated mainly by 
failings in administrative management (35%) and the 
provision of public services (30.2%) (see figure 11). The 
former encompass demands motivated by observations or 
disagreements regarding the way institutional management 
is conducted, whether in the public or the private sphere, 
while the latter include any conflict caused by the lack 
of or shortcomings in public works (roads, schools, 
hospitals, etc.) in a particular area, and by inadequate 
State provision of basic services.
As regards the distribution of institutional conflicts 
in subregions, the Andean countries are where the 
most such conflicts are to be found (41.2% of the 
total), especially Colombia and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia. Institutional issues account for 41% of all 
conflicts in Central America, the Dominican Republic 
and Mexico. Two groups of countries stand out in this 
subregion: on the one hand, Panama, Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic, where institutional conflicts are 
the most important class; and on the other, Honduras, 
El Salvador, Mexico and Costa Rica, with medium/low 
levels of institutional conflict. Lastly, 28.7% of conflicts 
in the Southern Cone are institutional, with medium 
levels in most countries (the exception is Uruguay, where 
just 20% of conflicts are of this type) (see figure 12).
The conflicts that most often tend to become 
highly radicalized are those relating to problems 
with administrative boundaries (56%), questioning or 
acknowledgement of authority (49%), administrative 
management (41%), breach of agreements (53%), public 
service provision (40%) and legal situation/measures 
(28%) (see figure 13). Radicalization is greater on 
average in the case of conflicts resulting from breaches 
of agreements and lower in the case of struggles relating 
to administrative boundaries and legal measures. The 
number of institutional conflicts and conflicts over 
issues of administrative management that become highly 
radicalized reveals the existence of structural causes that 
are at the base of the chronic weakness of institutional 
and governance mechanisms.
Latin America is characterized by the importance 
of a “para-institutional” dimension to conflict in many 
contexts. There is a grammar of relationships between 
FIGURE 11
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Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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the State and social groups that shifts between the formal 
and the informal. These are syncretic systems that retain 
“pre-capitalist” and “pre-democratic” organizational and 
cultural features, combined with modern institutions. Thus, 
personal networks and informal hierarchies, embodied 
in systems of patronage and favouritism, operate as 
everyday mechanisms for regulating social relations 
between individuals and with formal institutions. It is 
precisely in this “para-institutional” sphere that social 
actors in conflict operate.7
Lastly, irrespective of political orientation and 
with some case-by-case variations, Latin America has a 
structural problem with the processing of conflicts, which 
has tended to worsen because of the political inability 
of institutions and the State to deal with demands and 
identify the needs and issues of most urgent concern 
to the population. The type of governance that results 
tends to be weak and unstable.
7 Donzelot defines the Brazilian “art of negotiation” as a particular 
way of resolving conflicts through informal arbitration and negotiating 
mechanisms, in a practice that combines loose interpretation of legal 
principles, mutually agreed transgression of norms and the production 
of an informal legality with its own localized jurisdiction, free of the 
juridical and bureaucratic encumbrances of the State, all of which 
dislocates and subverts the supposed centrality and uniqueness of 
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thesis 8
Cultural conflicts are undertaken in pursuit of new 
forms of social accommodation and have systemic and 
global effects, but are more fragmented than other types 
of social conflict. They are largely strategic conflicts.
As we have seen, the Latin America region has 
chronic institutional weaknesses and exceptionally high 
levels of socioeconomic inequality, and is consequently 
fertile ground for the reproduction of what are likewise 
strong mechanisms of cultural inequality.
It is upon this fabric of complex inequality that the 
new needs and demands on the multifaceted cultural 
mobilization agenda of Latin America are coming 
together, with ideological and political conflicts and 
those relating to citizen security at the forefront.
Although cultural conflicts in all their variants are 
less numerous than conflicts in other fields, they have 
very strong systemic repercussions, owing to the role 
culture is playing in the new globalized context of Latin 
America. In terms of their impact on globalization, 
governance and democracy, then, these are strategic 
conflicts.
This field includes those conflicts whose roots lie 
in culture on a broad definition, with a strong accent 
on everyday life, subjectivities and multiple identities, 
and the culture industry and market. These conflicts are 
relatively few in number by comparison with the other 
fields (they represent 15% of all conflicts); however, 
they are a crucial category for understanding today’s 
social dynamics and the grammar of conflict in its new 
manifestations.
Cultural demands are usually about recognizing or 
strengthening the identities of individuals and actors and 
attaining a certain quality of life, focusing in the abstract 
on third generation rights and the concept of cultural 
citizenship. These conflicts express the need to affirm 
a type of socialization, both subjective and collectivist, 
in which social relationships and acceptable conditions 
of security are redefined.
Citizen security demands generate just over 28% 
of cultural conflicts. These are usually protests about 
a lack of protection against crime. The second most 
common type of demands are those relating to struggles 
over political ideology (about 25.7%, totalling 89 
conflicts). These are struggles between factions (usually 
political parties, internal groups within them or the like) 
over opposing ideological visions that have taken on a 
confrontational character. Some 24% of cultural conflicts 
are triggered by problems with natural resource use and 
deteriorating environmental quality as a result of specific 
actions taken by public or private agencies, or both (see 
figure 14). These demands may be conducted more within 
environmentalist parameters or from an instrumental 
perspective of control over natural resources, as the case 
may be. The success of these movements could be due 
in part to their ability to tie in the particular with the 
universal, stressing the current development pattern and 
some globalized values that are hard to question, such 
as protection of the global ecosystem.
FIGURE 14
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At the subregional level, cultural conflicts are 
16.3% of the total in the Central America, Dominican 
Republic and Mexico subregion, 15.5% in the Andean 
countries and 12.6% in the Southern Cone. Some of the 
countries with the most conflicts are to be found in the 
northern Andes: the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Colombia. The pattern in the Southern Cone is 
generally around the average, with two tendencies: 
Argentina on the one hand, with the largest number of 
cultural conflicts in absolute terms, and Brazil and Chile 
on the other. In Central and North America, lastly, El 
Salvador and Mexico stand out for their high levels of 
conflict, something that can be accounted for partly by 
their ethnic diversity, but most especially by the high 
levels of insecurity and human rights violations in those 
countries (see figure 15).
Conflicts over political ideology are the most likely to 
become radicalized in percentage terms (34%), followed 
by those relating to citizen security (32%), struggles 
over environmental issues (26%), human rights disputes 
(20%) and, lastly, those concerning values, beliefs and 
identities (13%) (see figure 16). As regards the averages 
for radicalization of cultural conflicts, struggles over 
political ideology or citizen security tend to be the most 
violent. The figure for the other conflicts category is 17%.
Generally speaking, political and ideological 
radicalization seems to be a factor that seriously affects 
governance and democratic coexistence, owing to the risk 
of degeneration into violent clashes and confrontation. 
Given this, it seems essential for agreements to be reached 
in pursuit of political and ideological accommodation 
in shared democratic spaces.
In the area of cultural conflicts, lastly, young 
people appear to play a fundamental role as subjects of 
mobilization and producers of new social demands. The 
tendency towards mobilization has also been heightened 
because of the extent to which young people’s expectations 
have been frustrated, owing to the negative socioeconomic 
situation of the previous period, institutional mistrust 
and rapid incorporation into “information” culture. This 
frustration is one of the drivers of conflicts, together 
with a perception of insecurity and exclusion as factors 
intrinsic to daily life, the breakdown of imaginaries and 
strains between the collective and individual levels. 
The young are a crucial section of society, embodying 
great potential for change and new thinking, and at the 
same time a Pandora’s box with the potential to cause 
chaos if their demands, expectations and frustrations 
are not successfully channelled. Thus, young people are 
like conflicts: potentially dangerous, but also renewers 
of the social order. Women are also crucial actors in 
cultural conflicts. Although gender tensions receive little 
expression and recognition in the public media space, 
they do have potential for cultural and strategic change 
in modern societies, most particularly because of the 
new thinking women can bring to politics and society 
as promoters of change and justice.
thesis 9
There is a growing tendency for traditional and new 
conflicts and actors to move on to information and 
communication networks.
The region is part of a new global system constituted 
by real-time networks of communication flows. These 
new forms of communication, knowledge and lifestyles 
that society has now incorporated have given rise to what 
Castells calls the “network society” (Castells, 1997).
The web has become the place where the new forms 
of conflict and power are expressed and developed. The 
culture of “technosociability” is changing not only the 
daily lives of individuals and communities, but politics 
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important role, as holding a protest or march without 
the presence of the media, whether vertical (television, 
radio and newspapers) or horizontal (the Internet and 
mobile phones) means that the demands expressed have 
little impact and are less likely to be met.
The new ways of communicating have led to intensive 
use of icts in the public space. This space is understood 
as the “meeting point” where ideas and values are shaped, 
transmitted, supported and combated (Castells, 2009). 
icts allows actors to interact more nimbly, flexibly 
and spontaneously and to participate more actively in 
politics. The ease of access and low usage costs of both 
the Internet and mobile phones increase the scope for 
collective action.8 Participating in a forum, a blog or a 
group within a social network is more easily achievable 
than other forms of political participation. Nonetheless, 
the information society reproduces the structural social 
8 Many of the region’s countries doubled Internet usage in the period 
from 2002 to 2010 (Informe Latinobarómetro, 2010) and about 
80% of Latin Americans own and use a mobile phone (International 
Telecommunications Union, itu).
divides of Latin American society. And if the region’s 
countries continue with an “informationalist” logic without 
making the switch to the model which characterizes the 
information society, the economic capacity to integrate 
the population into an inclusive development process 
will not be attained (Calderón, 2003).
As can be seen in figure 17, there is a direct 
relationship between the Human Development Index 
(hdi) and the percentage of Internet usage. According 
to the data, countries such as Argentina and Chile rank 
highest for both indicators, while Paraguay, Honduras 
and Guatemala are at the other extreme.
These data can be interpreted as showing the 
existence of a feedback loop between the two variables. 
In other words, access to icts and the Internet in 
particular could be seen as a factor that directly and 
indirectly benefits development indices, since they 
are tools that can improve people’s levels of social 
and political information and participation, as well 
as their basic living conditions in terms of nutrition, 
health and education; although they can also be tools 
for domination. Accordingly, “technology is a tool for 
FIGURE 16
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growth and development” (undp, 2001, pp. 29-30). Latin 
America is faced with a major challenge: narrowing 
the digital divide and participating fully in the growth 
model that is developing around the new technologies. 
One important step towards this is to provide access to 
the new technology for the whole of society, especially 
the young, and structurally reform the education system 
so that icts are adopted there (Calderón, 2003).
V
Actors on the web
(a) traditional actors
Many traditional sociocultural actors and movements 
in Latin America use web pages to position themselves 
within their countries or internationally. They use this 
medium to disseminate their values and ideas, thereby 
increasing their prospects of promoting political or 
cultural change and influencing opinion. Furthermore, 
using icts, and particularly the Internet, enables 
movements to interact and coordinate activities both 
internally and with other networks and organizations, 
thus socializing experiences.
Figure 18 shows that the development level and the 
percentage of Internet take-up both affect the number 
of actors with a presence on the web. On the one hand, 
countries such as Costa Rica, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Chile present high hdi scores and greater Internet 
usage, with a large percentage of actors represented on 
the web. At the other extreme are Paraguay, Guatemala 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the region’s least 
developed countries and those with the lowest Internet 
usage, where only a very small percentage of social 
actors have web pages, blogs or social networks to 
disseminate their demands.
FIGURE 17
Human Development index (hdi) and internet usage
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(b) spontaneous actors9
These emerge from the web, since whenever any 
widespread demand or discontent arises, it is transmitted 
spontaneously by thousands of people in a relatively short 
time through social networks, blogs, forums, chain e-mails 
or text messages. In the event of conflict, citizens can use 
these instruments to organize and spread information. 
De Ugarte (2010) calls this “cyberactivism”, meaning a 
strategy for changing the public agenda by disseminating 
a particular message and encouraging its spread by word 
of mouth, which is multiplied by personal electronic 
communication and publishing techniques. There have 
been cases in recent years where the public agenda has 
been successfully changed in this way. Cyberactivism 
9 Examples of spontaneous actors in Latin America are: (i) the student 
protestors known as the “penguins” in Chile, (ii) the InternetNecesario 
movement on Twitter in Mexico and (iii) “Un millón de voces contra 
las farc” (“A million voices against farc”) in Colombia. Case (i) 
occurred in 2006, with the demands of Chilean students for improved 
education quality. The success of the “penguin movement” was possible 
because of the way the students were organized, using icts to coordinate 
throughout the conflict. Case (ii) arose in 2009 on the Twitter social 
network in Mexico and reflected the discontent of thousands of users 
at the approval by the Chamber of Deputies of an increase of 3% in 
the cost of telecommunications from 2010. The reaction of users was 
immediate: “The Internet is not a luxury,” they claimed on Twitter, the 
result being a cyberprotest that lasted from 10 p.m. on 19 October to 
5 a.m. on 20 October. Case (iii) was an action that took place on the 
Facebook social network in January 2008 in Colombia, with the goal 
of organizing a massive countrywide march against violence. There 
were eventually 300,000 adherents (Neumayer and Raffl, 2008) and 
its repercussions extended beyond the social network to the media 
and the real-world public space.
has two phases: a deliberative phase, when blogs and 
forums are used to start the debate, and a mobilization 
phase, when e-mails and mobile text messages are used 
to get people out on to the streets.
One consequence of globalization has been the 
enhancement of individual capabilities, with spontaneity, 
determined political activism and self-organization 
coming to the fore (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002); as 
a result, it has become indispensable to redefine collective 
projects on the web. “The issue is the way individual 
action is the outcome of a collective commitment, and 
collective action can be viewed from the standpoint of 
individual agency” (undp, 2009).
thesis 10
A constructivist policy creates or improves a democratic 
society and is a powerful resource for coping with conflicts 
and adverse social climates. National situations are 
diverse and are inseparable from the social climate being 
experienced and the country’s political and institutional 
capacity for conflict processing.
The argument of this thesis is essentially hypothetical 
and prospective in character. It raises two questions. What 
conditions or what social climate affect the dynamic 
of conflicts? And is there the political and institutional 
capacity to process them?
By social climate is meant all the objective and 
subjective conditions in which conflicts arise, especially 
those connected with the equity, institutional structures 
and multiculturalism characterizing a particular country.
FIGURE 18
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Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
a Only actors with more than five conflict episodes in a particular conflict over the study period were considered.
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By conflict processing capacity is meant the 
capacity to move towards an equilibrium characterized 
by a legitimate State with wide-ranging and effective 
institutional instruments and spaces for processing 
conflicts in a positive way, together with an active society 
characterized by strong citizen participation in public 
life and a dynamic of creative collective action.
In other words, the need is for societies with actors 
who do not just protest but interact with other actors 
and the State, projecting themselves as thoughtful, 
autonomous subjects of development and democracy.
In general terms, Latin American States deal with 
an average of 11 new conflicts a month, the countries 
where there are the most conflicts being the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Peru and Argentina, with over 200 
in total. The countries with the fewest conflicts in the 
region are Costa Rica, Chile and El Salvador, with an 
average of 59.
The data reveal the existence of a Latin American 
society with a significant capacity for social action, but 
also with major asymmetries in mobilization capabilities. 
While the Plurinational State of Bolivia stands at one 
extreme with an average of 21.8 new conflicts a month, 
Costa Rica is at the other with an average of 2.3 conflicts 
a month (the ratio between the two averages is 9 to 1). 
This is all without classifying specific social movements 
and struggles.
It is not only a society’s capacity to mobilize or act 
collectively that has to be analysed, however. There is 
also the matter of the political and social capacity for 
processing conflicts when they do arise, whether numerous 
or not, and the set of collective imaginaries regarding 
conflict that are established in that society. Thus, a society 
and political environment capable of treating conflict as 
an opportunity to alter certain conditions rather than as 
something harmful or a hindrance to development will 
have a greater capacity to process conflict and to progress 
democratically. Similarly, a society that mobilizes but 
treats mobilization and conflict as an opportunity to 
seek and generate agreements (or the conditions for 
agreements) and not as a way of imposing a vision or 
an agenda is a society with conflict processing capacity.
Where society is concerned, then, the ability to 
process conflict is, first, the capacity it has for acting 
collectively, for mobilizing and protesting; and second, 
the ability to endow these processes with legitimacy 
through both the socialization of information and 
participation by the actors themselves in accordance 
with a constructivist logic. On the part of the State, the 
ability to process conflicts means both the capacity of 
institutions and parties for managing them and the way 
the State usually approaches them. Thus, there are States 
that are able to manage conflicts through the medium of 
solid institutions and States that use informal methods 
to manage conflicts.
Setting out from these variables, four dynamic 
scenarios were identified (see figure 19):
i. Countries where social tensions are generally low 
and the tendency is towards a constructive, pluralistic 
order of conflict (scenario 1).
ii. Countries that have a rigid or disproportionate 
institutional order and that tend to deal repressively 
with conflict or deny it (scenario 2).
iii. Countries which are highly vulnerable to upheavals 
and where the predisposition to deal constructively 
with conflict is severely limited (scenario 3).
iv. Countries which have an unstable order because 
their conflict processing capacity is weak and which 
have difficulty dealing with widespread social 
discontent (scenario 4).
These scenarios were used to construct a dynamic 
typology of the situation and prospects of the different 
countries, showing both countries with a considerable 
capacity for processing conflicts and a climate of social 
well-being (such as Costa Rica and Uruguay) and others 
with serious problems in their social climate and stark 
difficulties when it comes to processing conflicts (such 
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Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United 
Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos 
sociales en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
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improvement in the two variables at stake were identified. 
Figure 20 illustrates the situations and likely historical 
trajectories in the region.
To conclude and sum up, the countries of Latin 
America share common features where conflict is 
concerned: platforms of exclusion and chronic inequalities 
that citizens mostly question, complex conflicts that relate 
these inequalities to the number of conflicts and their 
intensity, a combination of social protests manifested 
both at the social and national level and on the cultural/
global level, practical rationalities in conflicts over social 
reproduction, side by side with demands for greater 
institutional effectiveness and efficiency and cultural 
conflicts of a systemic character. Other features include 
States that are omnipresent in all spheres of conflict, but 
with severe limitations when it comes to processing them, 
and societies whose conflicts are increasingly fragmented, 
new public spaces associated with communication systems 
where conflicts are represented in contradictory ways, 
and conflicts that are tending increasingly to move on to 
information and communication networks with multiplier 
effects in the new environments of power. In short, there 
is increased social complexity associated with political 
systems and States whose ability to manage it is limited. 


























Source: Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project-United Nations Development Programme (papep-undp), Los conflictos sociales 
en América Latina, La Paz, 2011.
(Original: Spanish)
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